1. The Court of Appeal confirmed that "protection from dangerous climate change is a human right" (in line with other recent decisions on the environment, such as the 'Swiss Grannies' case).

2. It is primarily for legislators and governments to take measures minimising the effects of dangerous climate change. But companies – including Shell – can have responsibility under the doctrine of the indirect horizontal effect of human rights. The effect of this doctrine is that "when dealing with private relationships, the court may include fundamental rights – or the values embodied in them – in its considerations when applying general private law concepts, such as conflict with what is proper social conduct according to unwritten law."

The judgment refers to being able to factor in soft law provisions, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct etc to give substance to the open standards to which companies are held under Dutch law.

3. Shell, as a corporate entity, has obligations to mitigate against "dangerous climate change" and to contribute towards achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement, by reducing Shell's GHG emissions. This is because it is one of the companies which "contribute significantly to the climate problem and have it within their power to contribute to combating it."

4. The court recognised the broad consensus that limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires following reduction pathways which reduce CO2 emissions by 45% by the end of 2030. But that is a global reduction which amounts to a net 45% reduction, which cannot necessarily be translated into a 45% reduction for each company. Some sectors, some companies and some countries will need to reduce more; others will need to reduce less.

5. The Dutch court will not (and should not have) ordered Shell to reduce its emissions by 45% (or any other specific percentage) by the end of 2030 and has left companies "free to choose their own approach to reducing their emissions in the – mandatory – climate transition plan as long as it is consistent with the Paris Agreement's climate targets".

1. The Dutch court was only asked to decide whether it could impose an obligation on Shell to reduce its Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions by 45%, 35% or 25%. But, of note, the court remarked that "It is reasonable to expect oil and gas companies to take into account the negative consequences of a further expansion of the supply of fossil fuels for the energy transition also when investing in the production of fossil fuels. Shell's planned investments in new oil and gas fields may be at odds with this." The extent to which oil and gas companies must take these negative consequences into account is left unspecified by the court.

2. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the court did not address where it would impose Scope 3 emissions reductions. Here, the Dutch court said that requiring Shell to reduce its Scope 3 emissions would not be effective in reducing global emissions (the emissions would continue to be made, just not by Shell). As that was precisely what Milieudefensie and the other claimants sought to achieve, they had no interest in their claim. It might have been helpful had the court provided some kind of indication when it might consider it appropriate to impose Scope 3 emissions reductions.

3. The court cited a lack of consensus in climate science as to what specific reduction percentage a company like Shell, or a company operating in the oil and gas sector, should adhere to as a ground for rejecting Milieudefensie's argument that a 45% reduction obligation applied to Shell. For the moment at least, the court does not consider that the climate science is sufficiently sophisticated as to measure an entity's reductions, especially in the context of compliance with reduction targets and obligations globally.

We are unlikely to have to wait a long time to find out if Milieudefensie and the other NGOs will seek to appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court. If they do and they have permission to do so, it may take several years before we have another judgment on this.

In the meantime, as the climate science becomes clearer, we would expect to see courts – in the Netherlands and elsewhere – more comfortable with monitoring compliance with set reduction targets.

Further to the Court of Appeal's endorsement of certain elements of soft law, such as NCP complaints relating to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, we would expect to see an increased use of such processes (in addition to the increase since new guidelines were introduced in 2023). The information gleaned and the recommendations issued during such a process are likely to be used as part of the body of evidence in claims relating to the reduction of GHG emissions (and others).

We also expect to see continued scrutiny and proceedings brought by activist groups against companies (and not just against States) in different jurisdictions as the legal framework evolves and the science progresses. The decision in Lliuya v RWE is likely to be impactful in this regard.